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Comments
Evidentiary Privileges and the Exclusion
of Derivative Evidence: Commentary and
Analysist
Invocation of an evidentiary privilege traditionally meant that the
confidential communications of a holder were protected from dis-
closure during judicial, administrative, or legislative proceedings.
This model of evidentiary privilege law does not take into account
information gathered from unauthorized preproceeding disclo-
sures of otherwise privileged communications. A minority of
courts seem willing to exclude this derivative evidence with little
or no explanation. These courts may unwittingly base their deci-
sions on privacy concepts recently proposed as one of the modern
justifications for the existence of evidentiary privilege law. Courts
confronted with this issue analyze it in confusingly, and often con-
trastingly, different manners.
"The privilege is that the confidential matter be not
revealed .... "
INTRODUCTION
Standard evidence law defines evidentiary privileges' as rules
designed to protect confidential communications, revealed within cer-
t The author wishes to dedicate this Comment to Kristen T. Bruesehoff and
Mohammed K. Ghods for their friendship, support, and "group-mindedness."
1. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 102 (1956).
2. At the outset, a few caveats are in order. This Comment does not address the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Instead,
this Comment focuses on the most recognized confidential communicative privileges in
American jurisprudence: the attorney-client, clergyman-penitent, physician-patient
tain defined relationships, from indiscriminate disclosure.3 The in-
tended beneficiary of a privilege's protection is referred to as its
holder.4 A holder may refuse to testify to the substance of a confi-
dential communication without fear of contempt proceedings or
other judicial sanctions.5 The privilege holder may also prevent the
recipient of the communication, such as an attorney or physician,
from testifying to its substance.' The holder carries the burden of
establishing that his or her confidence warrants the privilege's pro-
tection. 7 Traditionally, privileges required a judicial, administrative,
(which includes the psychotherapist/psychiatrist-patient privilege), and the husband-wife
privileges. It is important to distinguish between the two husband-wife marital privileges.
Although both are referred to as marital privileges, they are distinct and conceptually
different. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); United States v. Ammar, 714
F.2d 238 (3rd Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982). One is
the traditional privilege protecting confidential communications arising during the mari-
tal relationship. Blare v. U.S., 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1954); U.S. v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182,
189 (8th Cir. 1978). The other is the privilege that extends to testimony by one spouse
against the other, the so-called "adverse spousal" or "antimarital" privilege. Trammel,
445 U.S. at 53 (holding that in federal criminal cases, the testifying spouse is the only
one who may claim this privilege). Trammel criticized Hawkins v. United States, 358
U.S. 74 (1958), in which the Court decided the accused spouse had the right to claim the
privilege. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2234, at 230-31 (J.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (stating "the fear of causing marital dissension or disturbing
the domestic peace" was the justification for the privilege); In re Witness Before Grand
Jury, 791 F.2d 234 (2nd Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 443 F. Supp. 1273,
1281 (D. S.D. 1978); R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE
STUDY OF EVIDENCE 131 (1986) [hereinafter R. CARLSON]; J. CISSELL, FEDERAL CRIMI-
NAL TRIALS §§ 1909-14 (1987) [herinafter J. CISSELL]. For a discussion on the history of
privileges, see generally E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 66, at 161-63 (3d ed.
1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK].
3. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 72, at 171.
4. The holder of the privilege is the one to whom the benefit of the privilege
inures. U.S. v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1965), aff'd, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); see R.
CARLSON, supra note 2, at 605. Carlson states:
In the case of the professional privileges such as the one protecting attorney-
client communications, the holder is the person seeking professional services. In
the case of the spousal privilege, at least the communicating spouse will be
treated as a holder. We can phrase the test more broadly and inquire who is
the intended beneficiary of the privacy the privilege confers.
Id.; see also J. CISSELL, supra note 2, § 1907, at 586 (noting that privileges usually can
be claimed only by the owner of the privilege, that is, by the person vested with the
relationship protected by that particular privilege, whether he be a party or a witness).
5. S.E.C. v. OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031, 1039 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (the attor-
ney-client privilege's goal is protection-to shield against compelled disclosure). See gen-
erally Tacon, A Question of Privilege: Valid Protection or Obstruction of Justice?, 17
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 332, 333 (1979).
6. R. CARLSON, supra note 2, at 608.
7. The burden of establishing the existence of the privilege rests on the party
asserting the privilege. United States v. Costanzo, 625 F.2d 465, 468 (3rd Cir. 1980); In
re Grand Jury, 603 F.2d 469, 474 (3rd Cir. 1979). See infra note 29 and accompanying
text for a model attorney-client privilege statute and the requirements imposed on the
holder for the privilege to be invoked. See also United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 39 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). As an example, the court in United Shoe set
forth the following elements a party claiming the attorney-client privilege must prove:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
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or legislative proceeding as a condition precedent to their operation.,
This model of evidentiary privilege law becomes strained when
courts attempt to apply the privileges' protection to would-be privi-
leged information, disclosed without the authorization of the holder,
prior to the commencement of a judicial proceeding.9 The difficulty
person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is act-
ing as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney
was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the
purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services
or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for purpose of commit-
ting a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not
waived by the client.
Id. at 358-59. In addition, all privileges have exceptions limiting their scope. For exam-
ple, the Uniform Husband-Wife Marital Privilege specifically exempts a spouse from its
protection if the spouse is charged with a crime against a minor child, the spouses are
adverse parties, or when another person residing in the household is the adverse party.
UNIF. R. EVID. 504(c) (1986). See infra note 31, for the entire text of Uniform Rule 504.
The concern raised by the attorney-client privilege is concealment of crime or fraud.
See infra note 29, UNIF. R. EVID. 502(d)(1) (1974) (amended 1986) (Model Attorney-
Client Privilege Statute). The gist of the resulting exception is that statements made by a
client seeking advice to aid in the commission of a crime or fraud are not protected by
the attorney-client privilege. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 2298-99, at 572-80; see
generally Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Priv-
ilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443 (1986).
There are many exceptions to the physician-patient privilege as well. Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977) (Court commented on the large number of exceptions to the physi-
cian-patient privilege).
8. This Commentator shall use "judicial proceeding" to signify all kinds of rec-
ognized proceedings. Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(c) states: "The rule with respect to
privileges applies at all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings." FED. R. EVID.
1101(c). For purposes of this Comment, proceeding is defined as "any action, hearing,
investigation, inquest, or inquiry (whether conducted by a court, administrative agency,
hearing officer, arbitrator, legislative body, or any other person authorized by law) in
which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given." CAL. EvID. CODE § 901
(West 1980).
For a more complete discussion of when privileges apply, see infra notes 51-60 and
accompanying text. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (privileges are a testimonial right); United States v. Rogers, 751
F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1985) (the attorney-client privilege is an "evidentiary rule
designed to prevent the forced disclosure in a judicial proceeding of certain confidential
communications between a client and a lawyer"); Halfacre v. Arkansas, 292 Ark. 331,
334, 731 S.W.2d 179, 180 (1987) (the husband-wife privilege is an evidentiary rule and
applies only when a spouse testifies within a proceeding); State v. Cousin, 291 N.C. 413,
418, 230 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1976); State v. Kerr, 531 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975).
9. For example, consider the situation where confidences wrongfully revealed by
a patient's psychotherapist lead police to evidence sufficient to convict the patient of mur-
der. The issue then becomes whether this evidence, gathered solely as the result of the
unauthorized disclosure by the psychotherapist, is subject to exclusion under the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege. Gruzen v. State, 267 Ark. 380, 591 S.W.2d 342 (1979). For a
detailed discussion on this case, see infra notes 126-49 and accompanying text.
occurs when the unauthorized disclosure leads to additional, deriva-
tive evidence then used against the privilege holder.'0 This Comment
focuses on decisions of courts confronted with the issue whether such
derivative evidence may be excluded." Its primary focus is on three
court decisions, each of which viewed the privileges and their roles
from different analytical perspectives. Within this framework, this
Comment will demonstrate that: (1) courts see a need to protect the
privilege holder once an unauthorized, extrajudicial disclosure of a
confidential communication occurs; and (2) utilization of evidentiary
privileges as guardians for these interests leads to a distortion of
traditional privileges, both in the requirements for their invocation
and in the rationale which supports their justification.
Part I explores the impact and effect of modern privacy doctrine
on evidentiary privilege law. The focus on privacy frames this Com-
mentator's explanation of the willingness of some courts to extend
the privileges' protection temporally back to the unauthorized extra-
judicial disclosure, and to exclude all evidence from that point
forward.
Part II concentrates on when a privilege's protection is deemed to
apply. Although a privilege requires a judicial proceeding as a condi-
tion precedent to its application, once invoked, the question remains
whether the protection itself reaches back to before the commence-
ment of the judicial process.
Part III presents a critical analysis of court decisions on this issue.
The cases are broken down into two general categories: (1) those
decisions by courts willing to exclude derivative evidence under ordi-
nary privilege law, regardless of whether the disclosure is made dur-
ing a judicial proceeding; and (2) those decisions in which courts
associate the exclusion of evidence arising from an unauthorized dis-
10. For the sake of clarity, the issue is not whether the communication itself is
subject to exclusion under privilege theory. Excluding the confidence, unless authorized
to be disclosed by the privilege holder, is the normal function of all confidential privi-
leges. Instead, this Comment deals with exclusion of evidence derived as a result of the
confidence's disclosure.
11. None of the cases discussed in this Comment addressed whether excluding
derivative evidence was consistent with the underlying purpose of the privilege statutes
enacted by state legislatures. Most privilege statutes generally do not speak in terms of
excluding items like a gun, State v. Cousin, 291 N.C. 413, 417, 230 S.E.2d 518, 521
(1976); stereo equipment, State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29, 41, 680 P.2d 257, 266 (1984);
or a diary, United States v. Franklin, 598 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1979). Rather, privileges
are normally thought to exclude confidential communications.
For example, the language of the attorney-client privilege found in Uniform Rule of
Evidence 502 states that "[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent
any other person from disclosing confidential communications. . . " UNIF. R. EVID.
502(b) (1974) (amended 1986). Excluding communications derived from an unautho-
rized dislcosure of would-be privileged confidential communications may be less problem-
atic than excluding a gun. Nevertheless, some courts still seem willing to discuss the
possibility of excluding derivative evidence without first addressing whether this is the
kind of evidence privileges were designed to exclude.
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closure of confidential matter with the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine (normally discussed within the the context of the fourth,
fifth, and sixth amendments of the Constitution). These cases
demonstrate, albeit through markedly different analytical schemes,
the willingness of some courts to exclude evidence derived from an
unauthorized disclosure of a holder's confidential communications.
I. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXCLUDING DERIVATIVE
EVIDENCE
A. Introduction
For decades, evidentiary privileges have been the subject of con-
siderable debate in jurisprudence.12 Jeremy Bentham viewed them as
"one of the most pernicious and irrational notions that ever found its
way into the human mind."'" Another commentator referred to them
as nothing more than barriers conceived out of professional jealous-
ies which greatly impede the fact finding mission of the courts while
serving no important societal goals. 4 At the same time, others re-
gard privileges as significant protectors of human values and the re-
sultant exclusion of evidence as a merely "secondary and [an] inci-
dental feature of [their] vitality.' ' 5
This variation in privilege philosophy may stem from the very na-
ture of the privileges themselves. Other traditional evidentiary exclu-
sionary rules, for example the hearsay rule'6 or the opinion rule,' 7
promote the truth-seeking process by excluding unreliable evi-
12. Note, Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1454 (1985)
[hereinafter Note] (stating: "Attacked as impediments to the search for truth, praised as
guarantors of individual privacy, evidentiary privileges have long been a subject of con-
troversy within American law."); see also Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity And
Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 107-09 (1956).
13. J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 193-94 (J. Mill ed. 1827).
14. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 61, 85 (1973).
15. Louisell, supra note 12, at 101.
16. FED R. EvID. art. VIII. Federal Rule of Evidence 802 states: "Hearsay is not
admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED. R. EvID. 802. How-
ever, the testimony then would be excluded not because of the policy underlying the
privileges, but rather based on the inherent unreliability of the evidence. For a thorough
discussion on the hearsay rule, see generally M. LADD & R. CARLSON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 802 (1972) and MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 244-53.
17. The opinion rule vindicates the desire that a witness who testifies to a fact
must have personal knowledge of the fact. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 10, at 23. The
policy behind the rule is that courts want the most reliable source of information possi-
ble. Id.
dence. 8 Privileges, on the other hand, may lead to the exclusion of
potentially trustworthy and reliable evidence in order to protect in-
terests unrelated to the truth-seeking function of courts. 9 This ex-
plains the tendency among some courts20 and commentators" to con-
strue privileges narrowly, thus reducing the amount of evidence
subject to exclusion. Despite such hostility, privileges are recognized
in one form or another by nearly every state in the country.22
The tendency to construe privileges narrowly calls into question
the viability of excluding evidence derived from an unauthorized dis-
closure of a holder's confidences. The proposition that courts may be
willing to exclude even more evidence than traditionally excluded
under the privilege umbrella may seem untenable, even fallacious.
But, in certain instances, courts have expressed a willingness to do
so. Perhaps this suggests that judicial disdain for privileges is declin-
ing. Alternatively, it may be a barometer of the confusion caused by
retroactive application of an evidentiary exclusionary rule, whose in-
vocation is conditioned on the commencement of a judicial proceed-
18. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); see MCCORMICK, supra
note 2, § 72.1, at 171 (observing that other exclusionary rules of evidence, for example
the opinion rule and the hearsay rule, exclude evidence on the basis of the inherent unre-
liability of the evidence while privileges exclude evidence for reasons other than the facil-
itation of truth); see also Tacon, supra note 5, at 333. Tacon argues:
The common law has evolved a number of doctrines to exclude information
considered irrelevant (i.e., not tending to prove or disprove a fact in issue) or
unreliable. The exclusion of hearsay and involuntary confessions, for example,
is based on the supposedly unreliable nature of such evidence. The common law
also has recognized that the judicial policy of full evidentiary disclosure con-
flicts at times with other policy considerations and might well require the sub-
ordination of the evidentiary process to such competing interests. This recogni-
tion forms the basis of the common law concept of privilege ...
Id.
19. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 72, at 171.
20. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710 (Burger, C.J., stating: "Whatever their origins, these
exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expan-
sively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth .. "); Dennis v.
United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966) ("disclosure, rather than suppression, of rela-
vant materials ordinarily promotes the proper administration of criminal justice");
United States v. - , 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4th Cir. 1984) (party name under
seal); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1358 (4th Cir. 1984) (arguing "the
[attorney-client] privilege itself is not 'favored' and is to be 'strictly confined within the
narowest possible limits' "); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3rd Cir.
1979); United States v. Omni Int'l Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1414, 1421 (D. Md. 1986).
21. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 75, at 181 (stating: "Until very recently,
the heavy consensus of opinion among commentators has favored the narrowing the field
of privilege, and attempts have been made, largely without success, to incorporate this
view into the several 20th century efforts to codify the law of evidence."); 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 2, § 2192, at 73; De Parcq, The Uniform Rules of Evidence: A Plaintiffs
View, 40 MINN. L. REV. 301, 322 (1956) (observing that privileges "are on the way out"
and this result is "entirely desirable"); Krattenmaker, supra note 14, at 85.
22. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 76.2, at 183-84 (observing: [A]ll states possess
some form of husband-wife, and attorney-client privilege. All afford some protection to
certain government information. Most, though not all, allow at least a limited privilege to
communications between physician and patient.").
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ing, to promote and protect the interests of the holder violated prior
to the initiation of such proceeding.2"
A cursory review of the two most common theories underlying
privileges, the traditional privilege rationale of encouraging certain
relationships (the utilitarian view) and the more modern privacy jus-
tification, is warranted as a prelude to any discussion of the deriva-
tive evidence issue.24 Although no court has used the derivative evi-
dence issue to directly incorporate privacy concepts into privilege
law, this Commentator believes that privacy lays the foundation for
courts to do just that. Before addressing the privacy justification,
however, the traditional rationale of encouraging relationships is
considered.
B. Privilege Rationales
Traditionally, privileges were justified by courts2 5 and commenta-
23. Louisell, supra note 12, at 107 (arguing "[i]t is believed... that the major
hurdles in federal cases to correct analyses of the privileges center around current mis-
conceptions as to their nature, justification, and sociological, psychological and moral
importance").
24. These are not the only rationales commentators have used to explain the exis-
tence of privileges. Commentators have asserted that privileges may be based on political
motivations of elite classes of professionals. Note, supra note 12, at 1494 (arguing that
"[t]he very word 'privilege' suggests the protection of a favored elite .... Those en-
joying privileges today constitute some of the most politically powerful professions and
institutions in America: lawyers, doctors, the Church, the news media, and the govern-
ment."). Privileges have also been recognized as a means of preserving the image and
legitimacy of the legal system. Id. at 1498. This has been aptly termed the "Image The-
ory" because it is understood as preserving the legitimacy of the courts by minimizing
potential embarrassment to the legal system. Id. at 1498-1500.
25. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas-
ualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (held imperative that the
individual disclose all information, regardless of how embarrassing, disgraceful, incrimi-
nating, for the doctor to apprise the means of recovery); City of San Francisco v. Supe-
rior Ct., 37 Cal. 2d 227, 235, 231 P.2d 26, 30 (1951) (en banc) ("[a]dequate legal
representation in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or de-
fense of litigation compels a full disclosure of the facts by the client to his attorney.").
At issue today is confidential testing of individuals potentially infected with the Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency (AIDS) virus. Arguably, the high mortality rate suggests that
full and free disclosure should be allowed by a doctor once the patient is found to have
the AIDS antibody in order to reduce the chance of the spread of the AIDS virus. How-
ever, allowing a doctor the liberty to disclose results of the test could deter other individ-
uals from seeking medical advice and treatment for the disease. This in turn could lead
to an increase in the spread of the disease by persons who failed to seek medical treat-
ment because of their fear of disclosure. Implicit within the AIDS issue is the conflict
between protecting a person's rights to seek medical attention without fear that the re-
sults will be disclosed and protecting the public's right to disclosure of individuals in-
fected with the AIDS virus. See generally, Dunne & Serio, Confidentiality: An Integral
Component of AIDS Public Policy, 7 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 25 (1988).
tors26 as devices to encourage communication within certain special
relationships. Consider, for example, that a psychotherapist was una-
ble to assure his or her patient that communications during their
therapy session would remain confidential.27 This might inhibit the
patient from disclosing information vital to successful treatment.
Hence, the existence of privilege law is based on society's recognition
that certain relationships, such as that between the psychotherapist
and patient,28 attorney and client,29 priest and penitent,30 or husband
26. 8 3. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2285, at 527. Wigmore sets forth four condi-
tions necessary for the establishment of a privilege:
1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the commu-
nications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct dispo-
sal of litigation.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Wigmore found that all the requisites existed for establishing the privileges within the
attorney-client, id. § 2291, at 545; husband-wife, id. § 2332, at 642; and priest-penitent
relationships. Id. § 2396, at 877-78. He did not think the physician-patient relationshipjustified privilege status. Id. § 2380(a), at 829. However, Dean Wigmore never applied
his balancing test to the psychiatrist-patient privilege. Tacon, supra note 5, at 338. Ap-
plication of Wigmore's test in this relationship was attempted by Professor Tacon:
[T]he essence of psychiatry requires extensive revelations of "hidden" emo-
tions, fantasies, frustrations and such like. It is difficult to conceive of individu-
als entering into a psychiatric relationship except on the implicit understanding
that such confidences would be respected. The first condition [of Wigmore's] is
thus satisfied. Is confidentiality essential to the relationship? The answer here
must be affirmative. . . . The third condition is obviously satisfied for psychia-
trists as it is for physicians generally-the community has a real interest in
encouraging individuals to seek professional help in resolving mental health
problems. . . . The fourth condition is somewhat more difficult to fulfill. In-
deed, some have maintained that the primary consideration must remain the
correct disposal of the litigation; privilege would operate to thwart the just and
fair administration of justice.
Id. at 338.
27. Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions And The Law of Privileged Com-
munications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 611 (1964) (arguing that the one justification for
testimonial privileges is that "the relationship is rendered ineffective either because a
person is deterred from entering into it or because the person is frightened into non-
disblosure" during the existence of the relationship); see also Shuman & Weiner, The
Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination Of The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege,
60 N.C.L. REV. 893, 898 (1983) (where the authors posit five premises for a psychothera-
pist-patient privilege). One study by psychiatrists stated:
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain confidential-
ity. His capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon their will-
ingness and ability to talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for
him to function without being able to assure his patients of confidentiality, and
indeed, privileged communication. . . . A threat to secrecy blocks successful
treatment.
GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 45, 92 (1960).
28. The Uniform Rules of Evidence, with respect to privileges, were patterned
after the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. For a more detailed discussion on the
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Uniform Rules, see Note, supra note 12, at 1462. A typical physician or psychotherapist-
patient privilege statute is Uniform Rule of Evidence 503. It states:
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "patient" is a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a
[physician or] psychotherapist.
[(2) A "physician" is a person authorized to practice medicine in any state
or nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be.]
(3) A "psychotherapist" is (i) a person authorized to practice medicine in
any state or nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be, while en-
gaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, includ-
ing alcohol or drug addiction, or, (ii) a person licensed or certified as a psychol-
ogist under the laws of any state or nation, while similarly engaged.
(4) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to
third persons, except persons present to further the interest of the patient in the
consultation, examination, or interview, persons reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the communication, or persons who are participating in the di-
agnosis or treatment under the direction of the [physician or] psychotherapist,
including members of the patient's family.
(b) General rule of privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made
for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his [physical,] mental or emotional
condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, among himself, his [physician
or] psychotherapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treat-
ment under the direction of the [physician or] psychotherapist, including mem-
bers of the patient's family.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient,
his guardian or conservator, or the personal representative of a deceased pa-
tient. The person who was the [physician or] psychotherapist at the time of the
communication is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege but only on
behalf of the patient.
(d) Exceptions.
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization. There is no privilege under this rule for
communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient
for mental illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment
has determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization.
(2) Examination by order of court. If the court orders an examination of the
[physical,] mental[,] or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or a
witness, communications made in the course thereof are not privileged under
this rule with respect to the particular purpose for which the examination is
ordered unless the court orders otherwise.
(3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no privilege under this
rule as to a communication relevant to an issue of the [physical,] mental[,] or
emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon
the condition as an element of his claim or defense or, after the patient's death,
in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of
his claim or defense.
UNIF. R. EvID. 503 (1974).
29. A typical attorney-client privilege statute is Uniform Rule of Evidence 502. It
is followed in substance by approximately 19 states. G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBURG, Evi-
DENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES ch. XXIV, at 1-3 (1987) [here-
inafter EVIDENCE IN AMERICA]. It provides:(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "client" is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other
organization or other entity, either public or private, who is rendered profes-
sional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to ob-
taining professional legal services from him.(2) A representative of the client is (i) one having authority to obtain profes-
sional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of
the client or (ii) any other person who, for the purpose of effecting legal repre-
sentation for the client, makes or receives a confidential communication while
acting in the scope of employment for the client.
(3) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to
be authorized, to engage in the practice of law in any state or nation.(4) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed by the lawyer to assist
the lawyer in the rendition of professional legal services.(5) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably neces-
sary for the transmission of the communication.(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the
client (1) between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer's
representative, (2) between his lawyer and the lawyer's representative, (3) by
him or his representative or his lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a
lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending
action and concerning a matter of common interest therein, (4) between repre-
sentatives of the client or between the client and a representative of the client,
or (5) among lawyers and their representatives representing the same client.(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client, his
guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or the
successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association, or
other organization, whether or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer
or the lawyer's representative at the time of the communication is presumed to
have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client.(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule:
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought or
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client
knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud;(2) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a communication relevant
to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client, re-
gardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter
vivos transaction;
(3) Breach of duty by a lawyer or client. As to a communication relevant to
an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client or by the client to his
lawyer;(4) Document attested by a lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an
issue concerning an attested document to which the lawyer is an attesting
witness;(5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common
interest between or among two or more clients if the communication was made
by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in
an action between or among any of the clients; or(6) Public officer or agency. As to a communication between a public officer
or agency and its lawyers unless the communication concerns a pending investi-
gation, claim, or action and the court determines that disclosure will seriously
impair the ability of the public officer or agency to process the claim or con-
duct a pending investigation, litigation, or proceeding in the public interest.
UNtF. R. EvID. 502 (1974) (amended 1984).
30. A typical priest-penitent privilege statute, adopted by approximately 15 states
is Uniform Rule of Evidence 505. EVIDENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 29, ch. XXVII, at
1-2. Uniform Rule of Evidence 505 provides:
[VOL. 26: 625, 1989] Exclusion of Derivative Evidence
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
and wife,"' are to be encouraged and are of sufficient importance to
justify excluding potentially relevant evidence from the truth-seeking
process. To determine whether information is privileged under this
rationale, courts balance the benefit society derives from protecting
the relationship against the privilege's detrimental effect on the
search for truth.32
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "clergyman" is a minister, priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science
Practitioner, or other similar functionary of a religious organization, or an indi-
vidual reasonably believed so to be by the person consulting him.
(2) A communication is "confidential" if made privately and not intended
for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the pur-
pose of the communication.
b) General rule of privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to
a clergyman in his professional character as spiritual advisor.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the person,
by his guardian or conservator, or by his personal representative if he is de-
ceased. The person who was the clergyman at the time of the communication is
presumed to have authority to claim the privilege ,but only on behalf of the
communicant.
UNIF. R. EVID. 505 (1974).
31. An example of a typical husband-wife marital privilege statute is Uniform
Rule of Evidence 504. UNIF. R. EVID. 504 (1974). Uniform Rule 504 was amended in
1986 to comport with the Supreme Court's decision in Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40 (1980), EVIDENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 29, ch. XXVI, at 1. Nearly 20 states
had adopted a privilege statute similar to the original 1974 Uniform Rule 504. Id. The
new 1986 version is as follows:
(a) Marital communications. A person has a privilege to refuse to testify or to
prevent his or her spouse or former spouse from testifying as to any confiden-
tial communication made by the person to the spouse during their marriage.
The privilege may be waived only by the person holding the privilege or by the
guardian, conservator, or personal representative of the holder. A communica-
tion is confidential if it is made privately by a person to his or her spouse and is
not intended for disclosure to any other person.
(b) Marital facts. The spouse of an accused in a criminal proceeding has a
privilege to refuse to testify against his accused spouse.
(c) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule in any civil proceeding in
which the spouses are adverse parties, in any criminal proceeding in which a
prima facie showing is made that the spouses acted jointly in the commission of
the crime charged, or in any proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a
crime or tort against the person or property of (i) the other, (ii) a minor child
of either, (iii) a person residing in the household of either, or (iv) a third per-
son if the crime or tort is committed in the course of committing crime or tort
against any of the persons previously named in this sentence. The court may
refuse to allow invocation of the privilege in any other proceeding if the inter-
ests of a minor child of either spouse may be adversely affected.
UNIF. R. EVID. 504 (1974) (amended 1986).
32. See supra note 26, (Wigmore balancing test); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (privileges justified "only to the very limited extent that permitting
a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth");
Although the utilitarian rationale is still viewed as the primaryjustification behind privileges,33 commentators have begun to focus
on an individual's privacy interests as an alternative justification.3
This rationale has been hailed as a "healthy and overdue develop-
ment." '35 It bases protection of confidences, not on utilitarian values
where all of society has an interest, but, on the dignity of the individ-
ual personality36 and the right of the individual to "unfettered free-
dom [within] certain narrowly prescribed relationships. . . .,3 Pri
vacy preserves an individual's control over highly personal
information by assuring it will not be randomly disclosed without
that person's authorization.38
A prime example of how privacy interests have influenced privi-
lege law is modern court decisions involving the admissibility of tes-
timony by persons who "happen" to overhear privileged matter.39
Previously, courts held that an eavesdropper could testify to the con-
fidential information overheard40 and that a privilege should pre-
Note, supra note 12, at 1472 (asserting that communications made within a given rela-
tion should be privileged only if the benefit of protecting the relationship outweighs the
detrimental effect on the truth-seeking process).
33. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981) (Court's remark
regarding the attorney client privilege: "Its purpose is to encourage full and frank com-
munication between attorneys and their clients"); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 51 (1980) (noting the attorney-client privilege "rests on the need for the advocate
and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if
the professional mission is to be carried out").
34. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 77, at 186 (arguing the traditional justification
of the privileges, namely utilitarianism stemming from Wigmore's dictum, is not only
based on "highly questionable sociological premises, but also, affords little prospect for
meaningful reconciliation of values in this area"); Louisell, supra note 12, at 111 (argu-
ing Wigmore's bases have propagated the confusion of the privileges and are "sometimes
highly conjectural and defy scientific validation"); Saltzburg, Privileges and Profession-
als: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REv. 597, 605 (1980); R. CARLSON, supra note
2, at 608 (noting that "[t]he recent trend in both the case law and statutes has evidenced
more sensitivity to the interest in privacy").
35, See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 77, at 186.
36. Austin, The Use of Privileged Communications for Impeachment Purposes:
Part 1, 49 N.Y. ST. B.J. 564, 566 (1977).
37, Louisell, supra note 12, at 111.
38. Krattenmaker, supra note 14, at 86. The author asserts:
Privacy, in the sense that term is employed here, is not merely secrecy but also
involves the voluntary and secure control one possesses over communication of
information about oneself; a person locked in a closet against his will may have
secrecy but is unlikely to be enjoying privacy. Simple secrecy is in no sense a
valuable right. What makes privacy both a distinct concept and a valuable
right is the fact that it is voluntary and that it includes a secured ability to
control by oneself how much information about oneself is disseminated and the
scope and circumstances of its communication.
Id.
39. Older decisions found the privilege to operate only to preclude the parties
within the confidential relationship, and not the eavesdropper, from testifying. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 2, § 74, at 175-76.
40. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 74, at 175-76. For a more complete discussion
on the topic, see Annotation, Effect of knowledge of third person acquired by overhear-
[VOL. 26: 625, 1989] Exclusion of Derivative Evidence
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
elude only the participants in the confidential relationship from giv-
ing testimony.41 However, with the increased use of modern
electronic surveillance equipment,42 a majority of courts now prevent
the eavesdropper from testifying to the confidence4 3 unless intercep-
tion of the communication should reasonably be anticipated by the
privilege holder. 4 Interestingly, the standard now adopted by courts
to determine "reasonable anticipation" is whether the holder had a
reasonable expectation of privacy at the time the confidence was dis-
closed.4 5 Necessarily, this inquiry now requires courts to center the
privilege within a holder's privacy expectation.
The privacy standard may also force courts to analyze with
greater precision whether a communication should ever be elevated
to the level of privilege status.46 Under the privacy rationale, rights
as well as interests are personal to the holder of the privilege. This
will force courts to more accurately delineate the interests of the
privilege holder. In making such a determination, courts must now
balance the need for the evidence against the holder's loss of per-
sonal dignity and privacy if the confidence is disclosed.47 This is un-
like the traditional rationale which describes the interests at stake in
vague terms such as "public policy" and "societal interests," and
which does not see the protection of any one particular relationship
ing or seeing communication between husband and wife upon rule as to privileged com-
munication, 63 A.L.R. 107 (1929).
41. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 74, at 175-76.
42. See Cantu, Privacy, 7 ST. Louis PUB. L. REV. 313, 315-16 (1988). In discuss-
ing a citizen's privacy rights, the author states that privacy must be redefined due to:
[T]he emergence of the electronic data processing industry as an integral part
of the daily life of every man, woman, and child on the face of the earth. The
electronics age has arrived, and in so doing has changed our lives as well as our
outlook to the future. America has become a nation wherein the dissemination
of information is big business, and as a result individuals need protection now
more than ever before to insure their right of privacy.
Id. at 315-16.
43. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 466 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Minn. 1979); see
also Comment, Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Communications Inter-
cepted by Third Parties, 69 IOWA L. REv. 263 (1983).
44. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 74, at 175-76 n.5.
45. Id. at 175-76 (observing that a "number of cases upholding admissibility on
the facts before them state or imply that a reasonable expectation of privacy will bar the
eavesdropper's testimony").
46. Id. at § 77, at 186-87.
47. Even within the privacy standard there must be a balancing of interests. See
Note, supra note 12, at 1482-83 ("A decision to recognize a privacy interest in no way
determines whether a confidence will ultimately be protected by a privilege. The privacy
interest must always be balanced against society's interest in ascertaining the truth.");
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980) (employee med-
ical records are entitled to privacy protection but the protection is not absolute).
or confidence as an end in itself;48 the traditional rationale "ignores
specific injury to those actually before the court. . .. ""I
This notion of privacy is key in another respect. As noted above,
activating the privileges' protection requires the commencement of a
judicial proceeding. However, privacy interests are not temporally
confined to a judicial proceeding. Indeed, the would-be privilege
holder's privacy interests are frustrated the instant confidences are
wrongfully disclosed, regardless of whether a judicial proceeding has
commenced.50 The question then becomes whether courts are willing
to separate a privilege's remedial feature, the exclusion of evidence,
from its evidentiary requirement, the commencement of a judicial
proceeding, to make it address the holder's privacy interests when
they were initially thwarted. In fact, the issue of whether courts will
exclude evidence generated as a result of a violation of a confidential
communication hinges on when a privilege's protection is held to
apply.
II. WHEN PRIVILEGES ATTACH TO CONFIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS
The question of "when" privileges apply may seem moot. After
all, privileges are just one of many evidentiary rules and like all evi-
dentiary rules, privileges necessarily require the existence of an evi-
dentiary proceeding as a condition to their application. Federal Rule
of Evidence 1101(c) states: "The rule with respect to privileges ap-
plies at all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings." 5' One court
summed up the policy behind 11 01(c) as follows: "Rule 1101 sup-
ports the view that confidentiality once destroyed cannot be restored,
and that a privilege is effective only if it bars all disclosures at all
times." 52 California Evidence Code section 901, representing the
emerging view in the United States,53 defines a proceeding as "any
action, hearing, investigation, inquest, or inquiry (whether conducted
by a court, administrative agency, hearing officer, administrator, leg-
islative body, or any other persons authorized by law) in which, pur-
48. Note, supra note 12, at 1473.
49. Id.
50. This may be the case under the utilitarian rationale as well. That is, under
this justification, societal interests in promoting specific relationships do not magically
spring up once a judicial proceeding is initiated. Nevertheless, in the privacy context, the
interest itself is individuated to the holder so that, when this interest is frustrated, a court
may fashion a remedy designed to alleviate the specific injury to the holder.
51. FED. R. EvID. I101(c); see United States v. Mackey, 405 F. Supp. 854, 857
(N.D. Cal. 1975) (arguing there is "no question that under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence privileges apply to grand jury proceedings"); K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §
144, at 457 (1951) (discussion on the application of privileges to administrative
adjudications).
52. Mackey, 405 F. Supp. at 864.
53. R. CARLSON, supra note 2, at 604.
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suant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given.""
The difficulty faced by those courts which attempt to apply privi-
leges to exclude derivative evidence is that, technically, no "action,
case, or proceeding" may have existed when the extrajudicial disclo-
sure was made. However, as noted, disclosure of a confidence frus-
trates the privacy interest of the holder regardless of the existence of
a judicial proceeding.5 5 Thus, the question becomes whether privi-
leges are a viable tool to remedy the resulting harm (which is deriva-
tive evidence that would not have been discovered but for the unau-
thorized disclosure) to the would-be privilege holder. The remedy
might be the exclusion of most or even all evidence produced as a
result of the unauthorized disclosure.
If courts treat the privilege as attaching the moment the offending
disclosure is made, then derivative evidence, generated as a result of
that unauthorized disclosure, may come within the privilege's exclu-
sionary rule. In that case, the privilege's protection would attach
prior to any derivative evidence's discovery. On the other hand, if
courts do not attach the privilege's protection to confidences until a
judicial proceeding has commenced, then there is less chance that
derivative evidence will be excluded. 6
From a privacy standpoint, the individual's interests do not arise
at the "proceeding" stage, but rather when the communication is
initially disclosed without the holder's permission. 7 To protect those
privacy interests, it seems reasonable for courts to apply privileges as
if they had existed at the time the privacy interests were initially
frustrated.
For instance, when an individual consults his psychotherapist and
in confidence discloses highly sensitive and inflammatory "stuff," the
patient's privacy expectation is that the "stuff" will remain confiden-
tial forever."' Assume the psychotherapist reveals these confidences
54. CAL. EviD. CODE § 901 (West 1980).
55. R. CARLSON, supra note 2, at 604 (from the "perspective of the communicat-
ing parties, the nature of the proceeding in which disclosure occurs makes no difference;
the thing that will chill their communication is disclosure, in whatever context it
occurs").
56. United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1985). For an extended
discussion on this case in this specific topic, see infra notes 111-24 and accompanying
text.
57. See Louisell, supra note 12, at 113 (... "privileges are guarantees for the
benefit of their holders; they exist from the moment of their inception in the confidential
communication; they normally survive all the vicissitudes of life save only waiver by the
owner; they survive even his death. The law will protect them at all stages of their
existence.").
58. The facts in this "hypothetical" are not unlike those found in the case of
to police officers without the holder's permission and the police then
use this information to gather evidence sufficient to convict the pa-
tient of a crime. A court may treat the privilege (and its remedy of
exclusion) as if it applied at the moment the unauthorized disclosure
was made. This then effectively places the protection afforded by the
psychotherapist-patient privilege outside the confines of a judicial
proceeding. The patient-holder may now assert that the privilege ex-
tends back to the time of the unauthorized disclosure. The confi-
dence is now protected as of its initial disclosure by the psychothera-
pist, rather than being fair game until the opposition first sought to
introduce it into evidence. Accordingly, all derivative evidence gener-
ated from the confidence after the privilege was established is also
protected.
The above analysis reveals an inherent tension within privilege
law. Although rules of evidence, privileges protect interests extrinsic
to the truth-seeking function of the adjudicatory process.59 The ten-
sion is generated because such interests transcend the context in
which they apply. As noted, a patient has a privacy interest in
preventing the disclosure of confidential information shared with the
psychotherapist during a consultation, regardless of whether a judi-
cial proceeding has commenced against the patient. Some courts ap-
pear willing to use privileges to protect that interest and aid in the
prevention of unauthorized, extrajudicial disclosure of confidential
communications.60 The following section analyzes decisions by courts
confronted with this issue. It addresses the requirements these courts
impose as conditions to the exclusion of derivative evidence. It also
offers criticism of these decisions as they attempt to justify using
privileges to exclude derivative evidence.
Cutter v. Brownbridge, 183 Cal. App. 3d 836, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1986).
59. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 72-72.1, at 171-72.
60. See People v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 192 Cal. App. 3d 20, 29-30, 238 Cal.
Rptr. 761, 766 (1987) (court applied the privilege to suppress all documents falling
within the attorney-client relationship as well as any fruits thereof); United States v.
Boffa, 513 F. Supp 517, 523 (D. Del. 1981) (court was willing to apply the attorney-
client privilege to bar all confidential communications and any fruits flowing therefrom);
United States v. Seiber, 12 C.M.A. 520, 31 C.M.R. 106 (1961). In Seiber, the court
stated:
We are not unmindful "of the public advantage that accrues from encouraging
free communication" between spouses. . . .Like the board of review, we be-
lieve the rule insulating such privileged communications should be jealously
guarded. Yet, at the same time, before giving our imprimatur to an exclusion-
ary rule which extends the marital privilege to non-testimonial evidence, we
must weigh other considerations in the balance.
Id. at 109 (citing UNITED STATES, MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL § 1516(2) (1951)).
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III. COURTS' TREATMENT OF PRIVILEGES AND DERIVATIVE
EVIDENCE
A. Background
There are three possible sources of an exclusionary rule of law
permitting courts to exclude derivative evidence: (1) state law; (2)
the Supreme Court doctrine known as "fruit of the poisonous tree";
and (3) a federal statute.61 The first, in the privilege context, would
be the state's own privilege statutes.62 The second, the "fruit of the
poisonous tree", is a facet of the exclusionary remedy most often
associated with search and seizure violations of the fourth amend-
ment."3 That exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right, but
rather "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard fourth
amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect ... The
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unconstitutional conduct
by law enforcement.6 5 However, not all evidence obtained from a
61. Welch v. Butler, 835 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1988). The federal statutory exclu-
sionary rule is not considered here because there are no federal evidentiary privilege
statutes. For a discussion on federal privilege statutes, see infra note 62.
62. An attempt by the Supreme Court to adopt 13 proposed rules for a uniform,
codified law of privilege was unsuccessful. A copy of these rules is set out in 56 F.R.D.
183 (1972). For a complete discussion on privilege law in the federal courts, see Note,
supra note 12, at 1463-71. Instead, Congress enacted a single general provision, Federal
Rule of Evidence 501. Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light
of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with re-
spect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the
rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or politi-
cal subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
Congressional belief in the importance of the interests the privileges serve meant that
the Supreme Court could not alone adopt and reject privileges. Because of the Court's
attempt to codify privilege law, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1975), which now
requires Congressional approval before any change in the law of privileges.
The import of Federal Rules of Evidence 501 is that state privilege law generally ap-
plies in diversity cases. In criminal cases, on the other hand, courts are guided by "reason
and experience" and are not required to follow state privilege law.
63. The "fruits doctrine" was conceived in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The doctrine gained its name in Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338 (1939).
64. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
65. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). A case often associated with the
"poisonous tree" doctrine is Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), where the
Supreme Court excluded "fruits" obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest. The Court
fourth amendment violation is suppressed under the "poisonous tree"
doctrine. Rather, the test is whether evidence was discovered as a
result of intentional exploitation of governmental misconduct.66 Also,
if such evidence would have been "inevitably discoVerable" 67 the ex-
clusionary rule does not bar it, even though it actually was wrong-
fully obtained. The constitutional context in which the "poisonous
tree" doctrine has developed complicates its application by courts 68
to standard evidentiary problems.6"
Court decisions in this area offer little guidance for any meaning-
ful framework in which to analyze these cases.70 This may be indica-
tive of courts' views about the plausibility of this particular remedy
as a means to rectify the injury suffered by the privilege holder. 1
Alternatively, it may stem from courts' confusion about which exclu-
sionary rule they are applying. For example, an "evidentiary" exclu-
sionary rule approach is taken in United States v. Boffa,7 2 a federal
district court case from Delaware. Although this case focused pri-
held that a confession made by a defendant, who voluntarily reappeared several days
after lie had been unlawfully arrested and then released, was not "tainted" by the illegal-
ity of the arrest and was admissible at trial.
66. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488.
67. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984); U.S. v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463
(1980).
68. Among those courts which have raised the doctrine in the evidentiary privi-
lege context are: State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29, 41-43, 680 P.2d 257, 266-67 (1984);
State v. Welch, 448 So. 2d 705, 711 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Gruzen v. State, 267 Ark. 380,
393, 591 S.W.2d 342, 349-50 (1980); United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1318
n.8 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bonnell, 483 F. Supp. 1070, 1079-81 (D. Minn.
1979); S.E.C. v. OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031, 1039-40 (N.D. Tex. 1979); United
States v. Seiber, 12 C.M.A. 520, 523-24, 31 C.M.R. 106, 109-10 (1961); State v.
Cousin, 291 N.C. 413, 418, 230 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1976); State v. Kerr, 531 S.W.2d 536,
541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
69. It is doubtful whether the "fruits" doctrine would be applied outside its con-
stitutional setting. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37
U. Cm. L. REv. 665, 665-66 (1970). The author states:
The United States Supreme Court currently enforces an exclusionary rule in
state and federal criminal proceedings as to four major types of violations:
searches and seizures that violate the fourth amendment, confessions obtained
in violation of the fifth and sixth amendments, identification testimony ob-
tained in violation of these amendments, and evidence obtained by methods so
shocking that its use would violate the due process clause. The exclusionary
rule is the Supreme Court's sole technique for enforcing these vital constitu-
tional rights.
Id.
70. See, e.g., People v. Cunningham, 126 I11. App. 3d 637, 467 N.E. 2d 404
(1984) (summary dismissal of defendant's motion to suppress all evidence resulting from
the breach of the psychotherapist-patient privilege without explanation for decision);
People v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 192 Cal. App. 3d 20, 29-30, 238 Cal. Rptr. 761, 766
(1987) (court, without explanation, excluded all evidence, including derivative evidence,
under the attorney-client privilege).
71. For example, the court in Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d at 1318 n.8 held: "[W]e doubt
that a secondary source of information obtained through information protected by the
confidential marital communications privilege would in any way be 'tainted.'"
72. 513 F. Supp. 517 (D. Del. 1981).
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marily on interests related to evidentiary privilege law, it was not
entirely devoid of principles commonly associated with the judicially
created exclusionary rule used to protect constitutional rights.
In contrast, the Arkansas Supreme Court based its opinion in
Gruzen v. State7 3 on the judicially created "poisonous fruit" exclu-
sionary rule. The court did not look to the interests underlying evi-
dentiary privilege law to guide its decision whether or not to exclude
derivative evidence. Instead, the court focused on whether excluding
evidence generated from a wrongful disclosure of a holder's confi-
dence would deter wrongful government conduct, as required under
Wong Sun v. United States.74
Finally, a Louisiana appellate court, in State v. Welch,7 5 seemed
to take an "intermediate" approach, somewhere between Boffa and
Gruzen. It utilized a Gruzen style of analysis when it sought to apply
the exclusionary rule normally reserved for constitutional violations
of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments, to exclude derivative evi-
dence generated from an unauthorized disclosure. Yet, when decid-
ing the issue, the court did not base its analysis on the exclusionary
rule's rationale of deterring unlawful government action, as did the
court in Gruzen. Rather, like the Boffa court, it focused on the inter-
ests underlying privileges in determining whether to apply the exclu-
sionary rule.
These three cases are representative of the ways in which some
courts deal with this issue. In light of their analytically distinct ap-
proaches, each case shall be discussed separately. This Comment
does not purport to embrace any one of these three decisions as the
"correct" one. Rather, its purpose is to highlight the confusion sur-
rounding the various analyses by these courts on the issue of whether
to exclude derivative evidence, with hopes that future judicial deci-
sionmaking will be more precise on this issue.
B. Exclusion of Derivative Evidence Under a State Created
Exclusionary Rule
In United States v. Boffa,76 a "con-man" named Leroy Frank
Holman, a/k/a Robert Morgan (Morgan), fraudulently held himself
out as an attorney to defendants Eugene Boffa, Sr., Robert Boffa,
73. 267 Ark. 380, 591 S.W.2d 342 (1980).
74. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
75. 448 So. 2d 705 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
76. 513 F. Supp. 517 (D. Del. 1981).
Sr., and Frank Sheeran.7 Morgan had been previously incarcerated
for approximately fifteen years for various criminal offenses.7 8 While
jailed, he had acquired a working knowledge of the legal profes-
sion.79 Although he never received any formal legal training, earlier
in his "career" he had performed some legal research for attorneys
representing Jimmy Hoffa.80 While Morgan was out of jail, pending
an appeal, he began assisting defendants in their legal representa-
tion. Apparently Morgan and Sheeran had met during the Hoffa
trial."s
For several months Morgan performed various legal services for
all three men.8 2 Shortly thereafter, Morgan disappeared with a car
given to him by Boffa. 3 Subsequently, Boffa reported the vehicle
stolen.84 Two months later, Morgan was arrested in California for
possession of stolen property.8 5 In the impounded vehicle police
found several cartons of documents belonging to the defendants."8
Morgan was charged with obstructing a criminal investigation by
holding himself out as an attorney 7 and making a false statement of
fact to a federal agent.88 In return for a plea bargain agreement with
the F.B.I., Morgan engaged in monitored phone conversations with
his "clients," the defendants.8 9
Subsequently, defendants were charged with violations of the
criminal provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, 0 the mail fraud stat-
ute,91 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO).92 In their pretrial motion, defendants sought to suppress all
evidence having as its source certain disclosures made by Morgan to
the government, on the grounds that it was protected from disclosure
by the attorney-client privilege. The defendants claimed that Mor-






82. Morgan appeared at a hearing in front of Honorable Edward Cahn of the
United States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on June 6, 1977. Id.
In addition, Morgan appeared before Judge Van Artsdalen of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id.




87. 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (1988).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
89. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. at 121.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 186(b)(1) (1988).
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-42 (1988).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d) (1988).
93. Id. For a complete discussion on the attorney-client privilege, see McCoR-
MIuCK, supra note 2, §§ 87-97, at 204-42.
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turn, disclosed to the government and that these disclosures led the
government to additional information against defendants . 4
The Boffa court began its opinion by dismissing any constitutional
basis for the defendants' position. 95 The court next set out guidelines
each defendant was required to meet in order to qualify for suppres-
sion of "all" evidence under the attorney-client privilege statute.Y6
The first three criteria went to the establishment of the privilege it-
self.97 Next, the defendants would have the burden of demonstrating:
1) that Morgan disclosed to the government the confidential commu-
nications he received from the defendants; and 2) that the govern-
ment used these disclosures as a source for obtaining other evidence
that it intended to use at the defendants' trial.98 Once defendants
met this burden, the government would then have the ultimate bur-
den of establishing that its proof at trial had an independent origin,
untainted by any improperly obtained evidence.99
Unfortunately, the court found it unnecessary to expound in any
greater detail on this particular issue. Instead, the court decided the
defendants had failed to clear the first hurdle and establish a foun-
dation for the attorney-client privilege's application;' the court
stated that defendants were required to establish through more defi-
nite and particularized proof that their "attorney-client privileges
were breached."''1 The court also held that the defendants failed to
94. Although Morgan was not a member of the bar at the time he purportedly
represented the defendants, the rationale supports extending the privilege to those who
make disclosures under a mistaken, though genuine, belief. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§ 2302; Dabney v. Investor Corp. of Am., 82 F.R.D. 464, 465 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The
Uniform Rules of Evidence, a model statute set out in note 29, supra, also supports
extending the privilege to those who make a good faith mistake. UNIF. R. EVID.
502(a)(3) (1974) (amended 1984).
95. United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 517, 522 (D. Del. 1981) (the alleged
governmental intrusion into the defendants' attorney-client relationship occurred long
before any of the defendants were indicted and thus before their sixth amendment right
to assistance of counsel had attached); see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398(1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201, 205 (1964).




100. Id. at 525.
101. Id. at 526 (emphasis added). The court's finding on this particular point illus-
trates a point made earlier: the burden is on the defendant-holder to establish the privi-
leged nature of the confidence in order to successfully invoke its protection. See supra
note 7. The court also held defendants failed to demonstrate they made confidential com-
munications to Morgan, and that these same communications were revealed to the F.B.I.
Id. at 525-26. Finally, the court found that many of the disclosures made by Morgan to
establish that the government used any information obtained from
Morgan as a source for other evidence which it intended to use at
trial.10 2 In fact, the court held Morgan's information to be "rela-
tively worthless" to the F.B.I. 103 Thus, the court found it unneces-
sary to discern what evidence was subject to exclusion under the at-
torney-client privilege.
Nevertheless, Boffa demonstrates unequivocally a willingness by a
court to exclude evidence, under the right circumstances, derived
through a breach of confidence. This is not uncommon. Courts have
intimated that exclusion of derivative evidence arising from a breach
of confidence is a possibility under narrowly defined conditions.104
Although the Boffa court did not expressly delineate a rationale for
its willingness to exclude this kind of evidence, earlier in the opinion
the court stated that the attorney-client privilege was created in or-
der to foster full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients." 5 Further, the court held that "such confidences are at
the instance of the client permanently protected from outside
intrusion."106
In Boffa, the court referred to a violation of the sanctity of a confi-
dential communication as a breach of privilege.10 7 Failure to distin-
guish between the terms "violation of a confidential communication"
and "breach of privilege" may appear relatively insignificant. How-
ever, the fallacy of failing to do so is twofold.
First, at the time the confidence was initially disclosed (without
the holder's authorization), there simply was no judicial proceeding
in which the attorney-client privilege could apply. If evidence schol-
ars 1 8 are correct in defining privileges as evidentiary rules of exclu-
sion, arising only at the time of a judicial proceeding, then it is diffi-
cult to discern how evidentiary rules could possibly apply (or
privileges exist) before any judicial proceeding had commenced.
In addition, placing an unauthorized confidential disclosure on the
same level as a "breach of privilege" is problematic. Assume for a
moment that a court requires the commencement of a judicial pro-
ceeding as a condition to the application of any privilege's protection.
the F.B.I. indicated that if Morgan was consulted by the defendants, in many instances it
was not with respect to past wrongdoing but to future illegal activity and therefore the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege might apply. Id. at 527; see Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 2, § 95, at 229-31; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798
(3d Cir. 1979).
102. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. at 528.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 60, 68 and accompanying text.
105. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. at 522.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 526.
108. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 2192, 2197, 2285; MCCORMICK, supra
note 2, §§ 72-72.1, at 171-73.
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In this situation, a court may then choose to hold either that the
confidences are worthy of privilege status, or, in the alternative, that
no privilege applies, allowing testimony of the "confidence" into evi-
dence. However, using the terminology "breach of privilege" leads
inescapably to the conclusion that privileges are not just rules lim-
ited to evidentiary proceedings. Indeed, "breach" is defined as a fail-
ure to comply with a duty owed to another.10 9 The question thus
becomes: Where is the duty in the evidentiary privilege context?
Certainly the privilege holder, incident to a professional relationship,
is owed a duty based on the professional's own respective ethical
code."1 0 In terms of evidentiary privilege rules, however, it is difficult
to envision the duty concept, unless, of course, a court finds there is a
duty, under the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, to keep matters
confidential. If so, it follows, a fortiori, that courts may apply the
privilege's exclusionary effect as if it existed at the time the "duty"
was first violated, thereby expanding the privilege net to encompass
all evidence derived from the extrajudicial disclosure. That is, under
the Boffa approach, the taint develops at the time the attorney-client
privilege is "breached."
The importance of the perspective a court takes in viewing privi-
leges and the interests they serve is crystallized by comparing Boffa
to the Ninth Circuit's United States v. Rogers decision."' A com-
parison of these two cases demonstrates that the outcome turns on:(a) when courts hold the privileges to apply; and (b) what purpose is
served by evidentiary privileges. Are privileges merely a device
which prevent disclosure of confidential communications within a
"judicial proceeding?" Or do they have a more prophylactic function
as a buttress to protect an individual's confidences regardless of
whether a "proceeding" has commenced?
In Rogers, the IRS was investigating defendant's activities in a
109. S. Gins, LAW DICTIONARY 52 (2d ed. 1984).
110. Within many professions, codes of professional responsibility mandate the
confidentiality of the client's confidences revealed within the relationship. See, e.g. Pe-
trillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 588, 499 N.E.2d 952, 957(1986) ("The code of ethics for the medical profession is comprised of three separate
'prongs': (1) the Hippocratic Oath; (2) The American Medical Association's Principles
of Medical Ethics; and (3) The Current Opinions of the Judicial Council of the AMA(1984 ed.)"), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987).
Besides local statutes, attorneys' code of ethics on issues related to confidentiality are
governed by the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980) and
the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
111. 751 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1985).
motion picture tax shelter. 12 Agents of the IRS visited defendant's
former attorney at the attorney's office and questioned him on de-
fendant's activities. 3 The issue before the court was whether a gov-
ernment agency's contact with defendant's former attorney required
dismissal of the indictment against defendant."14 In refusing to dis-
miss the indictment, the court said:
Although the district court's decision and the briefs of the parties deal prin-
cipally with the issue of whether the questions and answers would be cov-
ered by the attorney-client privilege, the question is actually whether the
questions and answers involved a breach of the attorney's professional obli-
gation of confidentiality.
The attorney-client privilege is an evidentiary rule designed to prevent the
forced disclosure in a judicial proceeding of certain confidential communi-
cations between a lawyer and a client. In this case, there has not been any
forced disclosure of a confidential communication in a judicial
proceeding ...
The central question in this case is whether [investigators] improperly
induced an attorney to breach his ethical duty of confidentiality .... ,1,5
In Rogers, the court does not attempt to apply privilege law to out
of court statements made by the defendant's attorney. Unlike the
Boffa court, which spoke of the disclosure as a breach of the attor-
ney-client privilege, the Rogers court addressed the issue as one of a
breach of an attorney's professional ethical duty." 6 The Rogers
court refused to apply evidentiary privileges prior to the commence-
ment of a judicial proceeding." 7 This substantially diminishes the
chances of excluding derivative evidence generated from the attor-
ney's unauthorized disclosure. Under the reasoning of Rogers, a
court would have to find the violation of an ethical obligation, im-
posed on the attorney only by the attorney's own profession, as a
sufficient basis for excluding derivative evidence. 1 8
112. Id. at 1075.
113. Id. at 1077-78.
114. Id. at 1077.
115. Id. (emphasis added). The court reversed the lower court's ruling which had
dismissed the indictment against the defendants on the ground of governmental miscon-
duct. In doing so, the court held that merely inducing a witness to violate an ethical
obligation of confidentialy to a client would not require the dismissal of the indictment.
Id. at 1078.
116. Id. at 1077.
117. Id. at 1078.
118. The disclosure is also grounds to sue the attorney for a tortious breach of
trust. See Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corp., 99 Idaho 662, 667-68, 586 P.2d 1378,
1383-84 (1978) (the relationship of client and attorney is one of trust and good faith and
the breach or violation of the attorney's professional duty to the client could result in a
cause of action against the attorney); Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 1426 (1982). This commentator noted that "[t]hough still in rudimen-
tary form, a breach of confidence tort appears to be emerging from the case law to
provide a basis for recovery where existing law is deficient." Id. at 1426. In addition, the
commentator distinguished the "breach of confidence" remedy from the testimonial privi-
lege right: "[T]he immediate concern in testimonial privilege cases is different. The party
[VOL 26: 625, 1989] Exclusion of Derivative Evidence
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Given the different approaches in Boffa and Rogers to the issue of
when a privilege protection is deemed to attach, it is possible to read
Boffa as confusing evidentiary privileges with the ethical "privilege"
imposed on attorneys by the profession itself.119 According to Canon
4-4 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the ethical
precept is broader than the evidentiary attorney-client privilege and
"exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the
fact that others share the knowledge.' 120 Reference by the court in
Boffa to the unauthorized disclosure as a "breach of privilege" may
be illustrative of the confusion created from using the word "privi-
lege" to refer to both ethical and evidentiary rules; the court in Boffa
may have applied the broad ethical "privilege" rather than the more
narrow evidentiary privilege. Unlike the evidentiary privilege, the
ethical "privilege" creates an affirmative duty to keep confidences
communicated, incident to the relationship, confidential. 12' This is
one plausible explanation of the divergence in treatment between the
courts in Boffa and Rogers of the issue of "when" an evidentiary
privilege's protection applies.
Another distinction between the cases is the view of each court of
the purpose served by the privileges. In Rogers, the court found the
privilege to be "an evidentiary rule designed to prevent the forced
disclosure in a judicial proceeding of certain confidential communi-
seeking suppression is concerned with the unfavorable impact the disclosure will have on
his or her case, and may not be concerned about the extrajudicial effect of the disclo-
sure." Id. at 1432 n.20. Breach of confidence in this Comment refers to the unauthorized
disclosure and not to the tort flowing therefrom.
119. See S. GILLERS & N. DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND ETHICS 287-88 (1985) (the authors state: "[I]nformation protected by the law of
evidence is traditionally called 'privileged,' although the word 'privileged' is sometimes
loosely used to refer to the information protected under the rules of ethics."). Compare,
e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980) (setting out the
ethical guidelines an attorney must follow) with UNIF. R. EVID. 502 (1974) (amended
1984) (full text at note 29, supra) (setting out standards imposed by the law of
evidence).
120. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1980); see also In
re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 1976) (the "ethical obligation
of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client is broader than the attor-
ney-client privilege").
121. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980); T.
MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, 1987 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY 32 n.1 (1987) (quoting from ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 250 (1943): "to permit the attorney to reveal to others what is so disclosed,
would be not only a gross violation of a sacred trust upon his part, but it would utterly
destroy and prevent the usefulness and benefits to be derived from professional
assistance").
cations between a client and a lawyer."122 In Boffa, the court did not
seem to limit the privilege to evidentiary proceedings. It said:
The central issue in this proceeding rests solely on the firmly embedded
common-law rule that an attorney cannot disclose confidences entrusted to
him by his client without the client's permission. . . .Accordingly, it has
long been recognized that such confidences are at the insistence of the client
permanently protected from outside intrusion.1 2
3
Therefore, the court in Boffa arguably did not restrict the protection
afforded by the attorney-client privilege to a judicial proceeding, but
instead found the attorney-client privilege to be a permanent protec-
tion of confidential statements.
C. Evidentiary Privileges and the "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"
Doctrine
1. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree under Gruzen v. State
In contrast to the evidentiary approach used by the Boffa court,
some courts124 analyze the derivative evidence issue in terms of the
exclusionary rule commonly associated with violations of the fourth,
fifth, and sixth amendments to the Constitution.' 25 The Arkansas
Supreme Court, in Gruzen v. State, 26 framed the issue in terms of
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. It required a showing of
governmental misconduct as a condition precedent to the exclusion
of evidence generated from an unauthorized disclosure of a holder's
confidential communications.' 27
The defendant in Gruzen had been under the care of a private
psychiatrist, Dr. Pusin, for nearly seventeen years. 28 After exper-
iencing severe difficulties, defendant Gruzen left home for a time to
unravel his problems. 29 Upon returning, Gruzen immediately con-
tacted his psychiatrist and, during the counseling session, intimated
that while away he may have murdered a young woman. 30 Unsure
whether defendant was suffering from delusions, Dr. Pusin sent him
to see a forensic psychotherapist, Dr. Revitch, who participated in
the diagnosis. 131 Dr. Revitch concluded the story was factual,' 3 2 that
122. United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1985).
123. United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 517, 522 (D. Del. 1981).
124. See supra note 68 for those courts which discuss the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine in the privilege context.
125. Welch v. Butler, 835 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1988). The court held that the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" exclusionary rule applied "primarily to violations of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, although the Supreme Court has not explicitly limited its
scope to constitutional violations." Id. at 95.
126. 267 Ark. 380, 591 S.W.2d 342 (1979).
127. Id. at 393, 591 S.W.2d at 350.
128. Id. at 391, 591 S.W.2d at 349.
129. Id. at 384, 591 S.W.2d at 345.
130. Id. at 391, 591 S.W.2d at 348.
131. Id.
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Gruzen was psychotic and potentially suicidal. 33 Tormented by
knowing the details of a murder, Revitch decided to call his long
time friend, Captain Vallatt of the prosecutor's office.' 4 Revitch
asked Vallatt whether there had been any murders or reports of
missing women in Arkansas within the last few days' 35 Vallatt dis-
covered that a woman was murdered in Arkansas in the manner
Gruzen had described.136
Either Revitch or his wife suggested that Gruzen's parents, who
were concerned about their son, call Vallatt for more information on
Gruzen's whereabouts. 3 7 When the Gruzens called Vallatt, he
remembered his conversations with Revitch and realized Gruzen was
a suspect in the Arkansas murder. 8' Vallatt forwarded this informa-
tion to police in Arkansas who, in turn, applied for a search warrant,
using Vallatt's communications to establish the necessary probable
cause.' 39 Items uncovered during the subsequent search of Gruzen's
New Jersey home enabled police to place him in Arkansas at the
time of the murder.140 Prior to Revitch's disclosures, the police had
no clues whatsoever as to the identity of the woman's slayer.14'
On appeal, Gruzen sought to have all evidence connecting him to
132. Id. at 392, 591 S.W.2d at 349.
133. Id.
134. Id. The court does not delve into any of the ethical obligations imposed on a
psychiatrist in Arkansas under these circumstances. Many state psychotherapist privilege
statutes have narrow and limited exceptions. For example, California Evidence Code sec-
tion 1024 states:
There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has reasonable
cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to
be dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another and that disclo-
sure of the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966); see also Mavroudis v. Superior Ct., 102 Cal.
App. 3d 594, 599, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724, 729 (1980) (Evidence Code section 1024 held to
be applicable if the court finds that prior to the injury of plaintiff the therapist deter-
mined the patient's propensity toward violence); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17
Cal. 3d 425, 441-42, 551 P.2d 334, 347, 131 Cal. Rptr 14, 27 (1976) (a psychothera-
pist's disclosures held not to be a breach of trust or a violation of professional ethics if
the disclosure was necessary to avert danger to others). Arkansas' psychotherapist privi-
lege statute is adopted from Uniform Rule of Evidence 503 without modification. EvI-
DENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 29, ch. XXV, at 2. Unlike California, Arkansas does not
have a "dangerous patient" exception. EVIDENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 29, ch. XXV,
at 6-7; ARK. R. EVID. 503, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 16-41-101 (1987).






141. Id. at 392-93, 591 S.W.2d at 349.
the state of Arkansas obtained as a result of the "breach of the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege" excluded.142 Unlike the Boffa court,
which framed the issue almost entirely in terms of principles
grounded in standard privilege law, the Gruzen court saw the issue
as involving the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. That is, the
court applied the exclusionary rule normally associated with viola-
tions of the fourth amendment rather than with the privileges' evi-
dentiary exclusionary rule. The court found that no police miscon-
duct had occurred in discovering Gruzen's identity and denied his
motion. It seems implausible, however, to view Gruzen as supporting
the proposition that the unauthorized disclosure of confidential mate-
rial may involve a violation of the fourth amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
By invoking the general judicial exclusionary rule, the Gruzen
court focused on the conduct giving rise to the breach of confidence.
The Boffa court, on the other hand, focused on the nature of the
injury to the defendants once the "attorney" had revealed the sub-
stance of their communications. The difference in analysis between
Gruzen and Boffa demonstrates an important distinction between the
purposes served by the evidentiary privilege exclusionary rule and
the judicially created exclusionary rule. In the former, the real issue
is the unauthorized, nonconsentual disclosure of confidential matter.
Exclusion of evidence is not to deter wrongful government conduct,
as is the case in the general exclusionary rule, but rather to protect
and promote interests underlying the privileges, for example, pri-
vacy. In the latter, a court's inquiry is geared toward answering the
question of how the disclosure of the confidence comes about. When
applying the judicially created exclusionary rule, courts ignore the
real injury flowing from the disclosure, which is the loss of privacy
interests related to the control of confidential, personal information
142. Id. at 391, 591 S.W.2d at 348. Although commentators have suggested that
the doctor-patient relationship does not warrant privilege status (see, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 2, § 2285, at 528), nevertheless, many states have enacted doctor-patient
privileges. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). Of particular importance is the psycho-
therapist and psychiatrist-patient relationships. Here, especially, potentially sensitive and
volatile information must be openly communicated with the assurance of confidentiality
for treatment to be successful. See generally Tacon, supra note 5, at 338 ("[T]he essence
of psychiatry requires extensive revelations of 'hidden' emotions, fantasies, frustrations
and such like. It is difficult to conceive of individuals entering into a psychiatric relation-
ship except on the implicit understanding that such confidences would be respected"). In
addressing whether confidentiality was essential to the relationship, Tacon quotes Freud:
"The whole undertaking is lost labour if a single concession is made to secrecy." Id.
(quoting from 2 S. FREUD, COLLECTED PAPERS (1959)); see also In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal.
3d 415, 431-32, 467 P.2d 557, 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 839 (1970) (quoting from a
reference to M. GUTTMACHER, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952): a psychiatric
patient must expose "his entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame.").
For a general review of the physician-patient privilege, see MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §
98, at 243 and supra note 28 for a sample provision.
652
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about oneself.
This is not to suggest that Boffa was devoid of any principles nor-
mally associated with the judicially created exclusionary rule. For
example, after the defendants had met their burdens of proof on the
formation of the attorney-client privilege, the court in Boffa stated
"the government would then have. . .the ultimate burden of estab-
lishing that its proof at trial had an independent origin, untainted by
the improperly obtained evidence."14 The court, in essence, applied
the "independent source" doctrine, normally associated with the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule.' The doctrine requires evi-
dence shown to be obtained from sources independent of the illegal
conduct of government officials not to be excluded. The Boffa court
grafted concepts from the fourth amendment onto evidentiary princi-
ples of law, without mentioning the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doc-
trine in its opinion. Implicit in its use of this doctrine is its recogni-
tion that some wrongful governmental conduct must have occurred.
This is one way to reconcile Boffa with Gruzen.
The Arkansas Supreme Court does not grapple with the issue of
defining what exactly is meant by "governmental intrusion" in an
evidentiary privilege context. Given the terms of the fourth amend-
ment, a police officer knows that all individuals have a constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.145 However, this
analysis becomes strained when applied to evidentiary privileges.
How could a police officer, without clairvoyance or advance knowl-
edge, know that a particular line of questioning intrudes into some
holder's protected confidential communications? And who, at that
moment, is the final decisionmaker on whether these confidences will
enjoy privileged status?
For example, when a police officer questions a spouse regarding
the whereabouts of the other spouse, wanted in connection with a
burglary, chances are the spouse is not aware of the marital privilege
143. United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 517, 523 (D. Del. 1981).
144. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984); Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165 (1967); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
145. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). In Rakas, the issue was whether
defendants had standing to object to an allegedly unlawful search and seizure. The Court
held: "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a
property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protec-
tion of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Id.
at 143; see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (privacy held to be the
principal value upheld by the fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures). Privacy is also a principal rationale for the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self incrimination. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-63 (1966).
(assuming the information would be protected by the privilege).146
Preventing the police officer from questioning one spouse on the
other's whereabouts for fear of intruding on the other spouse's confi-
dences could unduly hamper law enforcement. In addition, unlike
ethical duties imposed on professionals, there is no obligation im-
posed on a spouse, as an incident to the marriage, to keep communi-
cations of the other spouse confidential. As one court said, "it does
not appear to be illegal for a spouse to speak to or 'tip' law enforce-
ment authorities even where confidential communications may be in-
volved.' 47 However, it is more probable to hold that police question-
ing a professional on matters likely to be held in confidence may lead
to either an abrogation of the respective professional's ethical duties,
or under some courts' interpretations to a breach of an evidentiary
privilege.
Addressing the feasibility of applying the general exclusionary
rule to deter a professional from disclosing confidences, one court
said:
In a case in which a government agency innocently learns of privileged in-
formation from a person who rightfully possesses that information, there is
no conduct to deter unless it is the delivery of that information by a person
who, although rightfully in possession of it, was not authorized to disclose
it. Even then, the only deterrent value would be to reduce the incentive for
such disclosure by barring the government's use of the information dis-
closed. . . .Such a holding would place ... [the attorney-client] privilege
on a higher plane than the fourth amendment protected privacy. Plainly
stating this result reveals that the reasoning path that leads to it is a
gossamer.1 4
8
Thus, it is unlikely that a court would invoke the exclusionary rule to
deter nongovernmental intrusion. It appears equally unlikely that a
court would exclude derivative evidence discovered as a result of po-
lice investigation, in the absence of a showing by a defendant that
police had advance knowledge of the information's privileged status.
Yet, even if police had such prior knowledge, it seems untenable to
146. Note, supra note 12, at 1475 (the relevant question is not whether too few
people know of a privilege, but rather whether enough would become aware of its
absence).
147. State v. Kerr, 531 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
148. S.E.C. v. OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031, 1039-40 (N.D. Tex. 1979). The
court rejected OKC's argument that the SEC was precluded from using a privileged
report prepared by a law firm for OKC to develop independent unprivileged information.
The court stated:
OKC's argument is flawed. The remedy that it requests will not further the
purpose of the privilege. The privilege's goal is protection-to shield against
compelled disclosure. OKC, however, does not seek to avoid the disclosure of
privileged information. Rather, it seeks to prevent the SEC from using the
privileged information to frame demands for information that are not privi-
leged but that may corroborate or explain information contained in an alleg-
edly privileged but already disclosed report.
Id. at 1039.
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say police may no longer question the defendant regarding the infor-
mation. After all, the privilege is not a self-executing right. It re-
quires the holder to invoke its protection.'49 Therefore, in the privi-
lege context governmental conduct wrongful enough to invoke the
exclusionary rule may be defined as intentional governmental intru-
sion, combined with the government's prior knowledge of the infor-
mation's privileged status, which interferes with the holder's privacy
interests without his or her prior consent. The proof required to meet
this burden would forever preclude a defendant from excluding de-
rivative evidence.
Finally, Gruzen is indistinguishable from Boffa in one important
way. Each court appears willing to protect the privacy interests of
the holder, regardless of whether a judicial proceeding had com-
menced when the unauthorized disclosures were made. As did the
Boffa court, the Gruzen court addressed the exclusion of evidence by
considering the privacy interest frustrated the instant the unlawful
disclosure occurred. Although the court in Gruzen did not exclude
"fruits" generated from the unauthorized disclosure, by addressing
the issue in terms of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," the court im-
plicitly found the privacy interests worthy of significant protection
although no judicial proceeding had yet commenced.
2. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree under State v. Welch
The Louisiana Court of Appeal, in State v. Welch,'15 also ad-
dressed the issue in terms of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doc-
trine. However, the court chose not to follow standard "fruit" exclu-
sionary law; instead, it found the doctrine inapplicable without a
showing of an attempt by the prosecutor to admit the defendant
holder's confidences into evidence during the defendant's trial. Un-
like the Gruzen court, the court in Welsh did not require a showing
of governmental misconduct as a condition for invoking the doctrine.
In Welch, defendant's wife taped two telephone calls she had with
him. During the last call defendant confessed to murdering a store
clerk with a tire tool. Defendant's wife turned these taped conversa-
tions over to the police. Defendant was picked up for questioning and
quickly confessed after being informed the police had knowledge of
his involvement in the murder. In a pretrial motion, defendant as-
149. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 73, at 173 (noting that the rules of privilege are
not self-executing and "must be asserted to be effective, and if not asserted promptly will
ordinarily be waived"); see also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 18 n.1.
150. 448 So. 2d 705 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
serted that all his statements to the police resulted from his wife's
violation of the husband-wife marital privilege statute. Defendant
sought to exclude all the evidence against him as "fruit" of his wife's
taping of their confidential communications.""'
The Welch court began its analysis by discussing the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in Wong
Sun v. United States.152 The court reasoned that Wong Sun required
"a finding that discovery of the evidence is the direct result of some
primary illegality or taint" to invoke the "poisonous tree" doc-
trine.153 Thus, the main issue was whether any "taint" originated
when Mrs. Welch hand delivered tapes containing confidential con-
versations between her and her husband to the police department.
The court held that no "taint" or illegality occurred when Mrs.
Welch handed the tapes over to the police officials.' It decided that
the husband-wife marital privilege prevented only disclosure at trial
of their confidential communications made during the marriage. 155
Since none of the taped conversations between Welch and his wife
had been introduced into evidence, the court refused to apply the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to bar evidence generated from
Mrs. Welch's disclosures to the police.' 56 The "taint" could not come
into existence until after defendant's confidences were admitted into
evidence.
The practical effect of requiring the admission of confidential
communications, as a condition precedent to the invocation of the
"poisonous tree" doctrine, is to foreclose all hope of excluding deriv-
ative evidence. On closer examination, the court's reasoning is circu-
lar. For example, the "fruits" gathered as a result of Mrs. Welch's
disclosure are subject to exclusion during the trial of the defendant
only if the taped conversations which contain the confidential com-
munications are first admitted into evidence at the defendant's trial.
This means that before the "poisonous tree" doctrine may take hold
to exclude derivative evidence, the confidences must be introduced
into evidence. Viewed pragmatically, this places Welch's ability to
exclude "fruits" in the control of the prosecutor. 157 For example, if
151. Id. at 711. The statute in question, LSA-R.S. 15:461, created two distinct
husband-wife privileges regarding the competency of one spouse to testify against the
other in a criminal proceeding. The first privilege is the confidential husband-wife privi-
lege, while the second is the so called "anti-marital" privilege. See supra note 2 for a
review on these two marital privileges.
152. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). For a review on the "fruit'of the poisonous tree doc-
trine," see supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
153. Welch, 448 So. 2d at 711.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 712.
157. If the defendant is the one who is introducing the testimony, it is no longer a
privileged communication but, rather, falls under the waiver doctrine. See infra note 159
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the prosecutor in Welch inadvertently attempted to introduce state-
ments made by Welch to his wife during his case-in-chief, then,
under the court's ruling, the "taint" necessary for invoking the "poi-
sonous tree" doctrine would be created. This leads to a devastation
of the privilege.
First, a prosecutor may have already introduced all the "fruits"
flowing from the unauthorized disclosure into evidence before at-
tempting to introduce the confidential statements made between de-
fendant and his spouse. Other than declaring a mistrial, how can a
court undo that which is already done? Second, assuming fortui-
tously that no "fruits" have yet been introduced into evidence, under
the court's reasoning, a defendant must now permit confidential
statements to be admitted into evidence to retain any hope of later
excluding any derivative evidence. However, in this second scenario
the court may find that defendant waived the right to assert the priv-
ilege. 158 Indeed, privileges are not self-executing but must be as-
serted in a timely manner or else the holder may be denied their
protection.1 59
The court in Welch would not have intended such an anomalous
result. Indeed, the court never confronted the issue directly and may
not have fully understood the ramifications of its reasoning. How-
ever, this case does exemplify the confusion engendered by mixing
the fourth amendment excusionary rule with evidentiary privileges.
The court sought to apply Wong Sun, despite the lack of any consti-
tutional violation. Additionally, the court did not require a showing
of governmental misconduct, a precursor to the invocation of the
"poisonous tree" under Wong Sun, as a condition to the exclusion of
derivative evidence.
The court might easily have dispensed with Welch's derivative evi-
dence claim by finding it not illegal for a spouse to "tip off" law
and accompanying text for a more complete discussion on waiver.
158. See supra note 149.
159. The waiver doctrine is not merely limited to words, but also encompasses con-
duct which manifests an intent to disclose. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 2327-29, at
639-41. An example of a waiver statute is Uniform Rule of Evidence 510. It states:
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure waives
the privilege if he or his predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily
discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged mat-
ter. This rule does not apply if the disclosure itself is privileged.
UNIF. R. EvID. 510 (1974). See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 93, at 223-27 (discussion
of waiver in the attorney-client relationship); id. at § 103, at 254-57 (waiver issues under
the physician-patient privilege privilege); id. at § 83, at 197-98 (enforcement and waiver
issues under the husband-wife privilege).
enforcement authorities even if confidential communications are in-
volved.'60 The reasoning required to reach this result would be strik-
ingly facile: privileges are testimonial in character and only the con-
fidences themselves communicated between Welch and his wife
would be inadmissible in evidence. 1' Such an approach seems more
in line with traditional notions of evidentiary privilege law.
The above cases reveal an alarming asymmetry in analysis on
whether to exclude derivative evidence arising from an unauthorized
disclosure of a holder's confidential communications. Gruzen and
Welch framed the issue in terms of the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine; each court, however, saw the "taint" which poisoned the
tree as arising in different contexts. In comparison, Boffa utilized
principles associated with both the state privilege exclusionary rule
and the "fruits" doctrine of Wong Sun; although, Boffa did not ex-
pressly mention the "poisonous tree" doctrine in its analysis. Never-
theless, as diverse as these cases appear, a thread of consistency
emerges: the interests underlying the law of privileges are deemed
significant and worthy of more protection than traditionally accorded
to them. This philosophy parallels that of commentators viewing
privilege interests in terms of individual privacy rights. Justice Doug-
las, dissenting in Lewis v. United States,162 aptly summed up the
importance of privacy interests in our modern society:
We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where everyone is open to
surveillance at all times; where there are no secrets from government....
Secret observation booths in government offices and closed television cir-
cuits in industry, extending even to rest rooms, are common. Offices, confer-
ence rooms, hotel rooms, and even bedrooms... are "bugged" for the con-
venience of government. Peepholes in men's rooms are there to catch
homosexuals .... Personality tests seek to ferret out a man's innermost
thoughts on family life, religion, racial attitudes, national origin, politics,
atheism, ideology, sex, and the like....
These examples and many others demonstrate an alarming trend whereby
the privacy and dignity of our citizens is being whittled away by sometimes
imperceptible steps. .... 113
The issue remains whether privileges are the right tool to protect
these interests. It may well be that the cases recognizing privileges'
ability to exclude derivative evidence are isolated incidents merely
signaling the confusion surrounding the application and purpose of
the privileges. More likely, they are the probable result of the diffi-
160. See State v. Kerr, 531 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (rejecting the
"poisonous tree" doctrine asserted by the defendant after his wife had gone to the police
with information about defendant's involvement in a murder). The court stated that the
marital privilege is "only... a testimonial privilege;... it does not appear to be illegal
for a spouse to speak to or 'tip' law enforcement authorities even where confidential com-
munications may be involved." Id.
161. Id.
162. 385 U.S. 206, 340 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 340-43.
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cult situations facing these courts. Certainly, in Gruzen, the defend-
ant's privacy interests were violated when his psychotherapist dis-
closed his confidences to the police. And yet, it may be unthinkable
for a court to exclude tangible evidence connecting Gruzen to the
murder of an innocent young woman. It would be particularly shock-
ing to exclude this kind of evidence under a mere evidentiary rule of
law. It is unlikely, and undesirable, for courts to exclude already ac-
quired tangible evidence which links a defendant to a murder, to
protect privacy interests in the absence of governmental wrongdoing.
However, in some cases it still may be patently unfair to allow use
of the derivative evidence against a defendant. For example, in cases
like Boffa there is an argument that courts should exclude derivative
evidence where the defendants were deceived by their "attorney"
with the aid of the government. It may well be that the element of
governmental intrusion into the privileged relationship, missing in
the Gruzen case, is the element necessary to justify excluding deriva-
tive evidence.
CONCLUSION
The exclusion of derivative evidence arising from an unauthorized
disclosure of confidential communications is subject to various analy-
ses by courts. The confusion in this area may stem from privileges'
protection of interests extrinsic to the truth-seeking process. Once
the confidence is disclosed, some courts treat privileges as if they
applied at that instant, regardless of the requirement of an eviden-
tiary proceeding. Having passed the first hurdle, courts apply exclu-
sionary rules from various sources. For instance, in its analysis, Boffa
applied the evidentiary privilege rule of exclusion. Gruzen and
Welch, however, saw the issue to involve the nonevidentiary, general
exclusionary rule associated with the fourth, fifth, and sixth amend-
ments. Significantly, all three courts recognized that an interest of
the defendant-holder was violated by unlawful disclosure of the
holder's confidential communications, regardless of whether a judi-
cial proceeding had commenced. Taken together, these decisions,
with their varying requirements, stand for the proposition that some
courts may be willing to expand the protective net of the privileges.
As this Comment demonstrates, however, whether the privileges are
the proper means to protect these interests remains in serious doubt.
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